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Viruses that originate in bats may be the most notorious emerging zoonoses
that spill over from wildlife into domestic animals and humans. Understand-
ing how these infections filter through ecological systems to cause disease in
humans is of profound importance to public health. Transmission of viruses
from bats to humans requires a hierarchy of enabling conditions that connect
the distribution of reservoir hosts, viral infection within these hosts, and
exposure and susceptibility of recipient hosts. For many emerging bat viruses,
spillover also requires viral shedding from bats, and survival of the virus in the
environment. Focusing on Hendra virus, but also addressing Nipah virus,
Ebola virus, Marburg virus and coronaviruses, we delineate this cross-species
spillover dynamic from the within-host processes that drive virus excretion to
land-use changes that increase interaction among species. We describe how
land-use changes may affect co-occurrence and contact between bats and
recipient hosts. Two hypotheses may explain temporal and spatial pulses of
virus shedding in bat populations: episodic shedding from persistently
infected bats or transient epidemics that occur as virus is transmitted among
bat populations. Management of livestock also may affect the probability of
exposure and disease. Interventions to decrease the probability of virus spil-
lover can be implemented at multiple levels from targeting the reservoir
host to managing recipient host exposure and susceptibility.
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Figure 1. Enabling conditions for Hendra virus spillover. A series of connected enabling conditions are necessary for spillover of emerging bat viruses. Bats must be
present. Bats must be infected and in most cases shedding pathogen. Virus must survive outside of its reservoir host (if transmitted indirectly), with access to the
recipient host. Recipient hosts must be exposed to the source of the virus in sufficient quantity for an infection to establish. Recipient hosts must be susceptible to
the virus. The area depicted in the layers is southeastern Queensland, Australia (see inset). The purple areas over layer 1 correspond to 20 km foraging zones around
known bat roost sites. Locations of the four horses on the bottom layer correspond to those of Hendra virus spillover events in 2011.
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1. Introduction
Bats are well-recognized reservoirs of zoonotic viruses. Agents
that spill over from bats to humans—such as filoviruses (Ebola
and Marburg virus), henipaviruses (Hendra and Nipah virus)
and coronaviruses (including severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus [SARS-CoV] [1–3])—cause severe disease in recipi-
ent hosts and have pandemic potential. For each of these
emerging zoonoses, spillover is predicated on ecological inter-
actions between the infected bat, the pathogen and the
recipient host species. Often the recipient is an intermediate
host species frequently in contact with humans; the recipient
then may infect humans. For example, humans were infected
with SARS-CoV by civets, and in some outbreaks of Ebola and
Nipah viruses by great apes and pigs, respectively [1–3]. In
some cases, viruses are amplified by these intermediate hosts.
The ecological events that drive interactions between source
and recipient species are rarely understood, probably because
the enabling conditions and drivers of cross-species transmission
occur over many scales of time, space and ecological organiz-
ation, from within-host pathogen evolution to spatially
extensive processes such as land-use and climate change
(figure 1). Such events, and how they lead to transmission of
bat viruses to other species, are the focus of this review.Although the role of bats as reservoir hosts of newlyemerging
pathogens has received considerable attention [4], that role may
also have a deeper historical dimension. Common human and
animal viruses, including the evolutionary progenitors of
measles, mumps, parainfluenza, canine distemper and hepatitis
C viruses, may have originated in bats [5,6]. Bats are unusual in
the extent to which they host zoonotic viruses compared with
ecologically similar taxonomic groups, such as rodents [7]. The
reasons are not readily apparent, but one hypothesis is that
chiropteran immune systems differ from those of most other
mammals, perhaps as an indirect effect of evolutionary adap-
tations for sustained flight [8,9]. As a consequence, bats may be
tolerant of infection and thus exceptionally hospitable reservoir
hosts. Recent surveillance has discovered new bat viruses with
zoonotic potential (e.g. [10,11]). These viruses may be spilling
over undetected, particularly where disease surveillance is
poor. Given the present limitations of global surveillance for
zoonotic diseases, focusing on the spillover dynamics of bat dis-
eases might be a wise use of the scarce resources for forecasting
pandemics, as exemplified by the 2003 SARS-CoV pandemic
and the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa.
Hendra virus, the first and best understood of a recent
series of high-profile emerging pathogens traced to bats,
typifies the spillover process for many bat-borne zoonoses.
Box 1. Within-host and among-host virus ecology in bats.
The persistence and propagation of viruses occur at multiple levels: cell of host, individual host, population of hosts, com-
munity of host species and landscape. Individual hosts are the habitat of viruses. To persist at the population level, viruses
must replicate, exit from and be transmitted among hosts. A host’s innate and adaptive immune responses work meanwhile,
in opposition, to contain or eradicate virus. Bats and henipaviruses, and perhaps filoviruses and coronaviruses, share an evol-
utionary history with their hosts that may accommodate an interaction between virus and host cells that results in no
apparent pathology or clinical disease [14–17] and in the case of henipaviruses, perhaps limited viral replication [14]. Yet
such accommodation allows the viruses to survive and to be transmitted among host populations and metapopulations.
Various constraints have impeded research on the within-host ecology of emerging bat viruses. RNA from henipaviruses,
filoviruses and coronaviruses is frequently detected in naturally infected bats, but virus is rarely recovered [16,18] (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S2). Ebola virus and African bat henipaviruses are yet to be isolated from bat hosts [19,20].
All live-virus work with such agents requires maximum biocontainment, at biosafety level 4. Therefore, even when isolates
exist, experiments are expensive, confined to certain laboratories and limited in sample size and duration. Additionally, heni-
pavirus infections have been difficult to establish in captive bats. For example, when 20 bats were inoculated with high doses
of Hendra virus, only one bat shed infectious virus [14].
The unusually low level of viral shedding from bats, and the difficulty of experimentally infecting bats, leads to hypo-
theses consistent with the distinct ecology of bats. Many bat species have dense, three-dimensional roost structures that
facilitate indirect transmission through droplets or aerosols of viruses excreted in urine or faeces. Although the probability
of developing infection from any given exposure to virus may be low, continuous exposure to a viral rain may lead to a high
probability of infection (electronic supplementary material, appendix S2).
Whether bat viruses are patchily or evenly distributed among roosting sites depends on the viral infectious period in
relation to movement rates of bats between roosts. Short infectious periods and low movement rates promote patchy viral
dynamics across populations, whereas long infectious periods and high movement rates homogenize dynamics [21].
While infectious periods are unknown for emerging bat viruses, many bat species have high movement rates [22,23] with
little spatial genetic structure (e.g. [20]). Consequently, antibodies (reflecting cumulative distribution of viruses) are often
widely distributed across populations of bats and communities of bat species [20,24–26]. Viral shedding, in contrast, is
often observed to occur in discrete pulses [24,27–29], suggesting short infectious periods with virus extinction and recoloni-
zation across roosts [30] or intermittent shedding from persistently infected individual hosts (electronic supplementary
material, appendix S2).
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Hendra virus, a negative sense, single-stranded RNA virus in
the genus Henipavirus (family Paramyxoviridae) [12], is endemic
in Australian Pteropus spp. (fruit bats or flying-foxes) (elec-
tronic supplementary material, appendix S1). Hendra virus
spills over from bats into domestic animals, primarily horses,
that amplify the virus and subsequently infect humans [13]
(box 1).
We propose an integrative conceptual framework for
assessing drivers of bat virus spillover from the cellular to
the landscape level. We focus on Hendra virus, but also
address emerging henipaviruses, filoviruses and coronaviruses
where possible. Bat lyssaviruses have not been included
because they are covered elsewhere [31]. Our approach
describes data gaps and priorities for future research, and
identifies potential interventions that may lead to prediction,
control and mitigation of spillover events.2. Enabling conditions for spillover of virus
from bats
Spillover of the emerging bat viruses requires a series of hier-
archical enabling conditions: reservoir hosts must be present;
reservoir hosts must be infected; if transmission is indirect,
reservoir hosts must be shedding pathogen and virus must
survive outside of its reservoir host with access to the recipient
host; recipient hosts must be exposed to the source of the virus
in sufficient quantity for an infection to establish; and
recipient hosts must be susceptible to the virus (figure 1).Hendra virus (box 2) provides an ideal case study for
developing insights into the dynamics of bat virus spillover.
Hendra virus circulates in bat populations throughout their
range [25,26,37] (electronic supplementary material, figure
S3), yet spillover occurred in only a part of the overlapping
distributions of fruit bats and horses [38], and affected only
a small proportion of the horses in an outbreak area. We
explored how the enabling conditions for Hendra virus
spillover, and other bat viruses where possible, interact to
explain spatio-temporal variation in spillover.(a) Distribution and density of reservoir hosts
The overlapping distribution of reservoir and recipient hosts
crudely delineates areas where recipient hosts are at risk of
infection. In subtropical regions of Australia, shifting bat distri-
butions, human population growth and changes in land use
collectively increase the area and incidence of co-occurrence
between bats and grazing horses (electronic supplementary
material, appendix S3).
Hendra virus spillovers most often have occurred where
urban and peri-urban areas are expanding and human popu-
lation growth is high [30,38]. An increased presence of horses
in these areas can be inferred [38]. Bats also have increased
their use of these landscapes [39]. High-quality but ephemeral
nectar resources in native flowering forests can support large,
seasonally migratory or even nomadic bat populations [22,40].
However, when nectar flows are diminished due to seasonal
conditions, habitat loss or climate change, bats seek alternative
Box 2. Patterns of Hendra virus spillover events.
Fifty-two events of Hendra spillover have been detected, all of which became major public health concerns. The discovery of
Hendra virus in 1994 was precipitated by a dramatic outbreak affecting 20 horses in a Thoroughbred-racing stable within the
suburb of Hendra (Brisbane, Queensland; electronic supplementary material, appendix S2). Two people closely associated
with the horses, the racehorse trainer and his assistant, became infected with Hendra virus. The trainer died from the
virus, whereas his assistant recovered [13].
From 1995 through 2005, Hendra virus spillover was rare and sporadic. Since 2006, Hendra virus spillover into horses has
been detected with increasing frequency and over an expanding geographical range. The scope of increase suggests an
increasing spillover trend (figure 2; electronic supplementary material, figure S1) despite increased surveillance efforts,
public reporting and detection. In 2011, there was an unprecedented cluster of 18 spillover events. The annual number of
spillovers in 2012 (eight) and 2013 (eight) was also well above the pre-2011 average (electronic supplementary material,
figure S2).
The recent discovery of Hendra virus exposure in two dogs on infected horse properties suggests that horses can be inter-
mediate hosts for infection of species other than humans [32,33]. Horse-to-horse transmission is usually limited to horses in
close contact within paddocks or stables [34], and there is no evidence of human-to-human transmission. Nevertheless,
repeated spillover events increase the likelihood of onward transmission of infectious agents in new hosts [35,36].
Hendra virus spillover events are clustered in time and space. All the subtropical spillovers have occurred in the cooler
months of May through October, with the peak in July. No spillover events have occurred in the subtropics during summer
(figure 2). In the northern tropics, spillover events have been detected throughout the year. The locations of clusters vary
among years. In 2011, for example, most spillover events occurred within a 160 km coastal strip in southeast Queensland
and northern New South Wales. In 2012, all eight spillover events were in the tropical north. The two spillover clusters in
2013 occurred in the subtropical south (electronic supplementary material, figure S2).
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Figure 2. Hendra virus spillover events from 1 January 1994 to 1 December 2013 by latitude, month and date. (a) The distribution of Hendra virus spillover events
across eastern Australia. The Tropic of Capricorn separates the northern tropics from the southern subtropics. (b) Hendra virus spillover events by latitude and date
within month. Letters represent months from April through March. (c) Hendra virus spillover events by latitude and date within year. The colours represent the
Gaussian kernel estimation of density of spillovers per unit area. Red represents areas and times with relatively high densities of spillover events.
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food sources in urban and peri-urban areas [39]. In some of
these locations, the number of roost sites has increased four-
fold since 1999 [41]. An increasing proportion of these
urban and peri-urban bats forgo migration and switch to
consistently available, but poorer quality, anthropogenic
food sources [42,43], including asynchronously fruiting trees
planted in horse paddocks [22,44]. These resident bats
become particularly susceptible to winter and spring food
shortages [42].
Coincident with these factors is another: the range of
black flying-fox is expanding rapidly southward at rates
faster than projected on the basis of climate change scenarios
[40]. Black flying-fox have a stronger association with Hendravirus spillover events than other flying-fox species [45],
and may be more likely to feed on the marginal foods that
support resident populations in anthropogenic landscapes
(K. Parry-Jones 2013, unpublished data). Thus, the range
shift of black flying-fox may contribute to the increasing inci-
dence and recent southern extension of Hendra virus
spillover events in the subtropics.(b) Pathogen shedding by reservoir hosts
Bat reservoir hosts must be infected and, in most cases,
shedding virus for spillover to occur (although direct con-
sumption of a bat, a bite from a bat or vector-borne
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evidence suggests that virus excretion from bats may occur in
spatial and temporal pulses that can drive spillover. For
example, clusters of Nipah virus spillover in Bangladesh, Mar-
burg virus spillover in Uganda and Hendra virus spillover in
Australia have been associated with pulses of shedding from
bats [28,29,32].
When shedding pulses are not occurring, many bat
viruses are detected rarely or at low prevalence. For example,
Hendra virus was rarely detected in bat populations [16,24]
until 2011 when Hendra virus RNA was detected in up to
two-thirds of pooled-urine samples from bats near cases in
horses (G. Crameri 2011, unpublished data; H. Field 2011,
unpublished data; electronic supplementary material, appen-
dix S4). High prevalence in urine pools was sustained for
two to three months [32]. Prevalence also was high in urine
pools during the Hendra virus spillover clusters in 2013
(G. Crameri 2013, unpublished data; H. Field 2013, unpub-
lished data). Similarly, Nipah virus prevalence in pooled
bat urine was 22% following cases in humans in Bangladesh,
but declined to 0% over two months [29], suggesting that
detection may be more likely if sampling coincides with spil-
lover. If outbreaks in humans are not documented, detection
of virus in bats may be difficult. Delays between Ebola spil-
lover, detection and sampling due to chains of infection in
apes and humans may explain why spikes in bat seropreva-
lence [47], but not virus detection, have been linked with
outbreaks in humans.
Two hypotheses may explain temporal and spatial pulses
of virus shedding in bat populations: episodic shedding from
persistently infected bats or transient epidemics passing as
waves of bat-to-bat transmission between bat populations.
These two processes have different drivers at the level of
individuals, roosts and metapopulations.(i) Episodic shedding hypothesis
There is a pervasive hypothesis that bats commonly host
persistent infections that do not cause apparent pathology or
disease [4,15,48], supported by the frequent isolation of viruses
from healthy bats of different species [8,11]. If persistent infec-
tions are suppressed by the host’s immune response [9,48],
viral replication and episodic shedding could occur when
intrinsic or extrinsic stressors weaken the immune response.
Bat populations excreting Hendra virus near the 2011 and
2013 spillover events experienced low food abundance and
exhibited signs of nutritional stress (P. Eby 2011, 2013,
unpublished data). Similarly, high antibody prevalence was
observed in a population that was nutritionally compromised
after a cyclone [25]. Given the susceptibility of urban and peri-
urban bat populations to food shortages, the link between nutri-
tion and Hendra virus shedding, including behavioural changes
that may drive transmission, should be a research priority.
Pregnancy in bats has been noted to coincide with high
seroprevalence and seasonal spillover of Hendra, Nipah and
Ebola virus [25,26,30,47,49]. However, the relation between
serological status (neutralizing or binding) and clearance or
shedding of these viruses is unknown, and other factors (such
as waning maternal antibody protection in pups) also coincide
with spillover or shedding pulses [27,28,30,38]. Pups could con-
tribute to shedding pulses if they develop productive infections
during the acute phase of infection (when first infected), or
because they provide a seasonal influx of susceptibleindividuals. However, before the effects of waning maternal
immunity on infections in juveniles can be assessed, we must
validate a protective effect of maternal antibodies.
More generally, experimental studies in which bats were
held in presumably stressful conditions, but well fed, have
not supported stress as a driver of shedding [14]. Nevertheless,
different types of stress in captive and wild populations—for
example, chronic, acute, nutritional and physiological—
may have different effects on host–virus interactions. It is
also plausible that physiological and environmental stressors
discussed above, and co-infections—an increasingly recogni-
zed phenomenon in bats [10]—could increase the probability
of individuals becoming shedders or even supershedders
(electronic supplementary material, appendix S4).
The occurrence of relapsing (recrudescent) Hendra and
Nipah virus encephalitis in humans has been used to support
the theory of episodic shedding from bats [50]. However,
relapsing Hendra and Nipah infections have been associated
with defective forms of virus that were not infectious, and
therefore do not contribute to transmission of disease (e.g.
[51]). Furthermore, pathogenic mechanisms in novel recipient
hosts do not provide evidence for related mechanisms in
reservoir hosts; each host species is likely to have a different
relationship with the pathogen. One study reported Nipah
virus shedding in a captive bat as recrudescence [50]; how-
ever, there are alternative explanations (see the electronic
supplementary material, appendix S4).(ii) Transient epidemics hypothesis
Epidemics that travel as waves of infection among hosts could
generate pulses of infection due to local virus extinction and
recolonization across roosts [52]. The critical enabling factor
for transient epidemics from a nonlethal virus is recovery
from infection and subsequent immunity. Over time, waning
population immunity (but not necessarily waning individual
immunity) allows reinvasion of the virus. Halpin et al. [14]
and Paweska et al. [53] provided experimental evidence for
short periods of viral excretion for henipaviruses and Marburg
virus, respectively. However, limited sample sizes and exper-
iment durations restricted their ability to assess virus
clearance (electronic supplementary material, appendix S4).
The gregariousness of bats, large group and population
sizes, multiple host species and mixing over extensive areas
could facilitate transient epidemics through extinction and
recolonization metapopulation dynamics [30]. Under this
scenario, decreases in migration observed in urban bat popu-
lations could disrupt transmission among host populations,
reducing colony immunity and increasing the magnitude of
epidemics when the virus is reintroduced [30]. The intensity
of pulses of epidemic infection, and whether pulses fade
out, reach a stable endemic state or recur, also depend on
interactions among population size, transmission rate, infec-
tious period, host replenishment rate, lifespan, rate of loss of
immunity, environmental forcing, previous exposure and con-
nectivity within and among subpopulations [30,52] (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S4). Most of these para-
meters are unmeasured—with the exception of population
size, which can, in many species of bats, vary rapidly from a
few to hundreds of thousands of individuals through migration
(e.g. [22]). If transmission increased with local population size
(as with density-dependent transmission), population size
could drive shedding pules [54]. There is no evidence that
horse exposure
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Figure 3. Risk factors for development of Hendra virus by horses. The concentration of virus in the environment is affected by the quantity of virus that bats are
shedding and the probability of virus survival outside of the bat host, which in turn are affected by the factors in (a). Exposure of horses to virus is affected by the
factors in (b). (c) The effectiveness of innate and acquired immunity determines whether horse exposure leads to fulminating infection.
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large populations of bats have been associated with periods of
high prevalence or shedding of Hendra virus (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S4).(iii) Differentiating between hypotheses
Distinguishing episodic shedding from transient epidemics is
challenging, and the two phenomena may not be mutually
exclusive. For example, episodic shedding from an individual
may generate waves of transmission through nearby suscep-
tible individuals. Moreover, the pattern of shedding given
persistent infection or transient epidemics may be indistin-
guishable, particularly when inferences are based on urine
collected under roosts (detecting shedding but not infection
status). One example may be the spatially extensive pulse
of Hendra infection observed during 2011. Environmental
conditions common among bat populations may have syn-
chronized shedding by synchronizing stress [30], or may
have synchronized transmission dynamics by creating similar
density-dependent processes among populations [55].
Definitive evidence that bats are persistently infected with
emerging viruses can only come from longitudinal studies of
individual bats that are isolated from re-exposure—requiring
experimental methods that establish patent infections in cap-
tive bats. Experiments, combined with field and modelling
studies as well as viral phylogeny studies (when sequences
become available), will ultimately decipher the complex
relations that drive the dynamics of bat viruses.(c) Survival of virus outside reservoir hosts and
environmental load
Bats are volant, spending most of their time in trees in which
they roost or feed, in caves or in transit. Bats spend little time
on the ground. Therefore, transmission of virus from bats tonon-volant species is most likely to occur indirectly via free
virus particles shed from bats onto fomites or surfaces, or
through virus-laden aerosolized urine or faeces (although
note Ebola virus transmission linked to consumption of bats
[46]). The stability of free virus in the environment determines
the temporal window during which indirect cross-species
transmission can occur.
Henipaviruses, filoviruses and coronoviruses are enveloped
RNA viruses that are sensitive to increases in temperature,
changes in pH, ultraviolet light and desiccation [56–58].
Under optimal laboratory conditions, henipaviruses may persist
for several days, and filoviruses for several weeks [56–58].
Environmental conditions in nature may be less optimal for
viral survival; temperature, humidity and microclimate under
trees and in caves may influence viral decay rates and ultimately
the likelihood of spillover. Hendra virus spillover has been
associated with relatively cool months with conditions similar
to those optimal for survival in the laboratory [57].
The interaction between virus survival and many other
factors, including the amount of virus released into the
environment and the time lag between virus shedding and
recipient host exposure, affects how much virus is available
to recipient hosts. The amount of virus shed from bats is
determined by the number of bats present, the amount of
time bats spend within the area, the shedding status of bats
and the viral load excreted (figure 3).(d) Recipient host exposure
During periods in which bats are shedding and contami-
nating the environment with virus, a small proportion of
recipient hosts typically develop viral disease. For example,
during a pulse of Nipah virus shedding in bats, an outbreak
in humans was traced to two exposures to date palm sap [29].
Likewise, during the cluster of Hendra virus cases in horses
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which bats were shedding developed Hendra virus. Hetero-
geneity in exposure of recipient hosts to viruses—driven by
interaction with the drip zone around trees—likely affects
the probability of accumulating an infectious dose (figure 3).
Bats excrete urine, faeces and saliva (within partially eaten
fruit) in a drip zone around trees where they feed or roost.
Horses may be exposed to Hendra virus when consuming con-
taminated grass, fruit, feed or water; or when browsing or
sniffing contaminated surfaces within this drip zone. Dis-
carded fruit pulp is thought to be a route of transmission of
Nipah virus to pigs in Malaysia [37] and Ebola virus to apes
in Central Africa [3], while contaminated vessels used to collect
date palm sap are a source of Nipah virus infection for humans
in Bangladesh [59]. Exceptions to drip-zone transmission may
occur when flying bats eliminate or drop partially eaten fruit
or when virus is aerosolized in caves (reported for Marburg
virus [60]).
Consumption rates within the drip zone may affect the
accumulation of an infectious dose of a bat virus. For example,
horses grazing on pastures with low nutritional quality,
especially low fibre content, may eat bark, tree leaves and
twigs for fibre, stomach fill and micronutrients [61], and new
grass growth under trees [62], increasing exposure to Hendra
virus. It is also conceivable that hungry horses are more
likely to eat fruits partially consumed by bats, or even bat
faeces, when other food is not available. The winter peak of
Hendra virus spillover events in the subtropics coincides
with the period of lowest pasture productivity [62] (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S5). Ebola outbreaks in
apes also occur during the dry season, when food is scarce
and ape and bat populations compete for fruit [3,47].(e) Susceptibility of recipient hosts
Henipaviruses and filoviruses have a broad species tropism
that probably reflects their use of cell entry receptors
that are highly conserved and widely distributed among
vertebrates [12,63]. Within species, however, variation in sus-
ceptibility of recipient hosts to emerging bat viruses, and
therefore the relation between cases in novel hosts and viral
loads in the environment, is not known. For example, it is
possible that environmental contamination and horse
exposure to Hendra virus may be widespread during periods
of shedding from bats, with susceptibility of individual horses
determining their probability of infection (figure 3). Horses
identified as spillover cases may be a small proportion of
those exposed.
Some data suggest that fulminating infection may fall at
one end of a spectrum of Hendra virus disease in horses (elec-
tronic supplementary material, appendix S2) [34]. Some
horses may eliminate infection in the mucous membranes
of the upper respiratory tract with rapid and effective
innate immune responses. Others may seroconvert asympto-
matically or seroconvert and recover after clinical disease. A
similar spectrum of disease severity has been reported in
humans infected with Ebola and Marburg virus [19].
Route of exposure probably affects susceptibility to Hendra
virus infections. The likely primary routes of exposure for
horses are nasal and oral [13,64]. However, behaviours such
as sniffing the ground to avoid faeces and urine while foraging
[65], along with the large surface area of nasal mucous
membranes and large respiratory tidal volume, may increaseexposure through inhalation. Perhaps this explains why
cases have been observed in horses and not, for example, in
cows, sheep, cats or other domestic animals.
Many additional factors affect the probability that an
exposed recipient host will develop an infection. Genetics,
general health and condition, secondary infections, previous
exposures, climatic and nutritional conditions, and dose
received can modulate the immune response and affect the
outcome of exposure [66].3. Summary
We suggest that the emergence of bat viruses in recipient
hosts requires at least five hierarchical enabling conditions.
The probability of occurrence of each is conditional on the
occurrence of the preceding condition; removal of any con-
dition should prevent spillover.
Interventions to decrease the probability of virus spillover
can be implemented at each level. Interventions at the first
level may include removal of the reservoir host. There has
been public and political pressure in Queensland to manage
Hendra virus by culling or dispersing fruit bat populations.
We found no evidence that the prevalence of Hendra virus
in bat populations was associated with population density,
and therefore that decreases in host density would reduce
virus prevalence. If increased levels of stress in bats facilitate
virus shedding, or if culled populations compensate with
higher birth rates or juvenile survival [67], disrupting
colonies may increase the amplitude of viral shedding events.
At the level of virus shedding, conservation and restora-
tion of critical bat feeding habitat should reduce the risk of
nutritional stress and reduce urban colonization by bats. For
Hendra virus in the subtropics, this would include forest
habitats that are productive during winter and spring [42].
At the level of virus survival, delaying recipient hosts’ inter-
action with bat excreta to allow viral decay should reduce
exposure; for example, fencing horses away from trees at night
should reduce exposure to Hendra virus. At the level of recipient
host exposure, interventions can be targeted at the route of
exposure. Barriers to collection pots for date palm sap can
reduce exposure of humans to Nipah virus [68]. Horse exposure
to Hendra virus can be reduced by watering and feeding horses
away from trees, providing alternative shelter, and providing
adequate dietary fibre and nutrient supplements (electronic
supplementary material, appendix S5).
Vaccination is the standard intervention to modify host
susceptibility. A recent vaccine for Hendra virus in horses
initially had low uptake due to factors such as cost and
lack of data in pregnant mares [69], highlighting the social
challenge inherent when implementing interventions.
Although we have identified multiple, hierarchical enabling
conditions for spillover, many conditions occur simultaneously
and have common environmental drivers. Therefore, differen-
tiating causal from correlational factors is a major challenge
[70]. For example, winter in subtropical Australia is the peak
of resource scarcity for both bats and horses. Bats move into
human-dominated landscapes to find alternative food, increas-
ing their co-occurrence with horses, their vulnerability to
nutritional stress and possibly excretion of Hendra virus. Cool
temperatures may maximize virus survival, increasing the
cumulative dose available to horses. Low productivity of
pastures leads to horse consumption of contaminated fruit or
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
8grass, as well as poor horse condition and higher susceptibility.
Controlled experiments, in which some of these factors are
manipulated and predictions compared with models, would
be desirable. However, the difficulties and dangers of working
with these viruses hinder such experimentation.
Tracking the dynamics of emerging diseases from the cell
to the landscape will be necessary to assess the weight of
evidence for potential causes and to elucidate how human
activities affect one or more of the enabling conditions.
Such a multiscale approach will move research into a realm
that informs implementation of interventions and solutions.Acknowledgements. We thank M. Rainey and R. Egloff for help produ-
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